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Abstract
In recent years, connected autonomous
vehicles (CAVs) feature an increasing number of
Ethernet-enabled electronic control units (ECUs),
thereby creating more threat vectors that provide
access to the Controller Area Network (CAN) Bus.
Currently, mitigation techniques to protect the CAN
bus from compromised ECU units in vehicle ad hoc
networks (VANET) often utilize classical cryptographic
techniques. However, ECUs often have temporal
signatures that leak internal state information to
eavesdropping attackers who can leverage temporal
properties for longitudinal attacks. Unfortunately, these
types of attacks are difficult to defend against using
classical encryption schemes and intrusion detection
systems (IDS) due to their high computational demands
and ineffectiveness at protecting CAVs throughout the
duration of their long lifespans. In order to address
these problems, we propose a novel cryptographic
framework that protects information embedded in ECU
network communications by delivering an encryption
system that periodically “salts” the temporal dynamics
of individual ECU units with chaotic signals that are
difficult to learn. We demonstrate the framework on
two datasets, and our results show that the underlying
temporal signatures cannot be approximated by
state-of-the-art learning algorithms over finite time
horizons.
1. Introduction
The design of effective encryption techniques has
long been a difficult problem in cyber-security research
for connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) [1]. In
recent years, CAVs feature an increasing number of
Ethernet-enabled electronic control units (ECUs),
creating more threat vectors that provide access to
the Controller Area Network (CAN) Bus. Currently,
mitigation techniques to protect the CAN bus from
compromised ECU units in vehicle ad hoc networks
(VANETs) often utilize classical cryptographic
techniques. However, due to increasing computational
power and the rising number of automated attack
algorithms, mitigation by classical cryptographic
techniques can be ineffective in protecting CAVs
throughout the duration of their long lifespans.
Manufacturers can, however, purchase expensive
intrusion detection systems (IDS) as a second-line
of defense. Because an IDS can be computationally
expensive to embed into ECU networks, the may be
difficult to scale in mass production. Additionally,
ECU units often leak temporal information about their
internal states (e.g., clock off-sets, odometer readings).
By observing the change in internal states across time,
one can approximate a set of temporal dynamics that
generate these “temporal signatures.” Attackers that can
learn the temporal signatures of ECU units can launch
longitudinal attacks that are difficult to detect by IDS.
This paper introduces a novel encryption framework
that protects the ECU network integrity by embedding
temporal signatures of ECUs in chaotic signals that are
updated aperiodically, and thus more difficult to learn.
Recent work in the automotive domain have
demonstrated the capacity for automated algorithms
to recover hashes designed by classical cryptographic
techniques in relatively short time periods [2, 3].
Moreover, classical cryptographic techniques cannot
protect against a wide range of ECU temporal signals
that are prominent in a communication network. For
example, low-level ECUs often leak signals with
periodic signatures, thus allowing for easy spoofing
and denial of service (DoS) attacks on critical units.
Thus, the design of an effective encryption system must
not only provide a secure authentication mechanism,
but it must also protect against the propagation of
compromised units during incremental attacks.
A key observation is that there exists a commonality
among attacks that possess the propensity to escape
classical encryption and IDS systems: the attacker
learns some unprotected temporal signals governing
critical ECU units in a network and then incrementally
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modifies the underlying temporal off-sets in a way that
remains undetected by the system’s anomaly detection
mechanism. The key assumptions enabling such attacks
can be summarized as follows: (1) the attacker must be
able to approximate the temporal patterns of a subset
of ECU units, which presumably follow a set of fixed
periodicities, and (2) the attacker can increase the noise
according to a smooth function such that the IDS system
cannot detect the change in baseline over a long period
of time. In order to address these challenges, we
introduce a dynamical encryption system that adaptively
“salts” the temporal dynamics of individual ECU units
with aperiodic signals that are difficult to learn.
We present a technique to mask the original ECU
signatures within an ECU network with a set of
chaotic dynamics, synchronized across the VANET.
We also equip this dynamical encryption mechanism
with an aperiodic update algorithm that updates the
salting mechanism in a way that makes it difficult to
approximate using state-of-the-art learning algorithms.
We show that aperiodicity is needed to deal with the long
lifespans of CAVs, which makes classical encryption
mechanisms susceptible to brute force algorithms when
given enough time for computation.
We validate our framework on two datasets: a
synthetic dataset involving temporal signals following
chaos dynamics [4, 5], and a benchmark dataset from
the University of California Irvine (UCI) machine
learning repository [6]. Our results demonstrate that
the proposed encryption system can dynamically mask
temporal signals in a way that cannot be approximated
by state-of-the-art learning algorithms over finite time
horizons. The remainder of this paper is organized
as follows. We summarize related work in Section 2.
Section 3 characterizes the so-called “nudging attacker”
that embodies the key limitations of modern security
approaches for ECU protection. We formalize the
problem of encrypting ECU communication channels
in Section 4. The proposed method is described in
detail in Section 5. Experimental results are presented
in Section 6. Key conclusions and future directions are
discussed in Section 7.
2. Related Work
Conventional encryption techniques such as
elliptical curve cryptography (ECC), public-key
cryptography (PKI), and symmetric key cryptography
(e.g., AES) are limited in their applications in VANETs
due to memory constraints, high computational cost,
and limited adaptability to ad hoc changes in VANET
topologies [7, 8]. Recent advances in lightweight PKI
(e.g., [9]) has alleviated portions of the computational
overhead, allowing for conventional approaches to be
applied in the ECU and VANET settings. However,
Verdult et al. [10] showed that brute force algorithms,
given state-of-the-art computational power, can
compromise VANETs that are encrypted by Megamos
Crypto algorithm (used by many manufacturers) in
seconds. Thus, encryption keys need to be frequently
updated over the lifetime of CAVs, a costly process
using classical methods. Furthermore, the state
information of ECUs are often high-dimensional and
span across numerous time-steps; the temporal nature
of the data presents a unique challenge for classical
encryption schemes.
Recently, Cho et al. demonstrated that IDS based
on clockwork off-sets can detect intrusions based
on deviations from standard ECU fingerprints [11].
However, the proposed IDS is based on regressive least
squares (RLS) and detects anomalies that deviate from
baseline in accordance to linear transition dynamics.
An attacker can thus incrementally increase the attack
intensities to perturb the clockwork off-sets in a way that
dominates the mean ECU temporal signatures without
detection by the RLS system. For example, Cho et al.
alluded to the possibility of a “weak attacker” whose
main goal is to eavesdrop on the signals produced by
various ECUs in a network in order to obtain ECU
temporal fingerprints. Thus, a potential solution should
offer an encryption system that protects the temporal
signatures along the time dimension in order to prevent
long-term synchronization of its intrinsic periodicities
with attackers.
3. The Nudging Attacker
In this section, we formulate the problem setting
of ECU communications into a dynamical systems
framework and introduce the characteristics of the
incremental attacker – we call it the “nudging attacker”.
We present the nudging mechanism as a circuit
synchronization problem where the attacker can observe
and learn the true dynamics of the driver ECU circuit
and incrementally change its update rules through
low-amplitude messages.
3.1. Notation
Here, we overview key notations used to describe
the problem setting and our proposed technique. We
denote x(t) ∈ Rn to be the state vector representing
the internal state of an ECU at time t ∈ [0,∞). We
denote x˙ = F (x) to be the update dynamics of the ECU
and denote xˆ as the perceived dynamics of the receiver,
which in this case is the CAN Bus. Similarly, we denote
Fˆ as the approximated dynamics from receiver’s point
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of view. Note that x and xˆ may differ due to inherent
noise in the communication channels. Similarly, F and
Fˆ correspond to the same function when the receiver is
the CAN Bus. However, if the receiver is an attacker,
then Fˆ may not be known perfectly as in the CAN
Bus case, and large deviations where Fˆ 6= F leads to
de-synchronization.
3.2. ECU Communications as Synchronizing
Circuits
We formalize the problem setting by considering
ECU communications in a VANET as a synchronization
problem between circuits that operate by state dynamics
that can be described by ordinary differential equations.
Consider, for example, the communications between an
arbitrary ECU unit and the CAN Bus:
x˙1 = F1(x(t)) . . . x˙n = Fn(x(t)) (Driver Circuit)
Here, the “driver” component is the ECU unit that
sends characteristic messages x1(t) ∈ R to the
“receiver” circuit that is the CAN Bus. For example,
x1(1), . . . , x1(T ) can be a sequence of continuous
signals that carry critical information regarding the ECU
functionalities to be integrated into the CAN Bus for
prioritization, broadcasting, etc.
˙ˆx = Fˆ (y, xˆ2(t), ..., xˆn(t))
y(t) = x1(t) (Receiver Circuit)
The receiver circuit represents the CAN Bus, which, in
reality, only observes the x1(t) component of the ECU
state. The CAN Bus modifies its internal dynamics
Fˆ to approximate the actual dynamics of the ECU.
Finally, we define synchronization between circuits to
be a condition where
lim
t→∞ ||x(t)− xˆ(t)|| = 0. (1)
Under this formulation, we can observe several
important characteristics. For example, the CAN Bus
only observes a subset of the state variables (i.e., x1(t)),
but the entire dynamics of the ECU circuit may depend
on several state variables – that is, the system dynamics
F (x) depends on n-distinct state variables x ∈ Rn. In
reality, even when an encryption system is placed on
the CAN Bus, they typically protect the state variable
in direct communication between the CAN Bus and the
ECU unit of interest [12]. However, other components
of x (e.g., clock off-sets, computational usage, energy
output patterns) can often leak important information
regarding the state dynamics of the ECU system [11].
3.3. Attacker Dynamics
Suppose an attacker has access to several state
variables that follow temporal patterns (e.g., fingerprint
information of x2, . . . , xn) [11], an attacker can mimic
the baseline behavior of the ECU unit – this is
often called a “weak attacker” [11]. Under this
setting, the attacker, when given enough time, can
approximate x1 from the approximate state dynamics
Fˆ by state-of-the-art learning algorithms (e.g., extended
Kalman filters (EKFs), RLS algorithms, recurrent neural
networks) [13, 14]. At this point, we can define the
modified system with a learned attacker as follows:
x˙ = F (x(t))
s(t) = x1(t) +m(t) (Driver Circuit)
Here, the attacker’s dynamics closely mimic those of
the original ECU, with the exception of the s(t) =
x1(t) + m(t) component. As a result, the CAN Bus
now receives a competing signal:
˙ˆx = Fˆ (s(t), xˆ2(t), ..., xˆn(t))
y(t) = s(t) (Receiver Circuit)
The receiver circuit cannot distinguish between s(t)
and x(t), given that ||m(t)|| < ε for some threshold
value ε. Given the same set of initial conditions,
Pecora et al. [15] and Cuomo et al. [16] showed in
previous studies that with the choice of Lyapunov
function V (e) = 12 (p1e1 + p2e2 + · · · + pnen)
and properly chosen parameters p1, . . . , pn, the error
dynamics e1 = x1(t) − s(t), . . . , en = xn(t) − xˆn(t)
become globally exponentially stable and decays toward
the origin in finite time. In other words, the attacker
can synchronize with the CAN Bus while delivering
additional messages m(t) without desynchronizing the
overall communication between the ECU unit and
the CAN Bus. In Pecora et al. [15], the authors
demonstrates that m(t) can actually be used to send
messages to be decoded by the Receiver Circuit.
In our case, depending on what type of information
is chosen in m(t), the attacker can deliver various
downstream effects on the ECU and CAN Bus
communications. For example, at some time t > 0, the
attacker may choose to inject a large noise ||m(t)|| >>
ε that desynchronizes the systems, resulting in DoS.
However, a sudden increase in m(t) (non-smooth or
discontinuous) can easily be detected by an IDS that
detects anomalous signals outside of baseline behaviors
[11]. Thus, we define a nudging attacker as one that
progressively increments ||m(t)|| slowly, in a way that
remains within the baseline behavior of x(t) as to not be
detected by the IDS.
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4. Protection of ECU Communications
To address the unique challenges posed by the
nudging attacker, we propose an encryption scheme
based on choosing the right masking signals at
each time-step to prevent attackers from learning the
underlying fingerprints of ECU signals. We embed the
original ECU signal in a masking signal that follows
non-stationary transition rules across time. The masking
signal is unpredictable by approximators over finite
time-horizons, and the underlying signal cannot be
recovered without knowing the update and transition
rules, that is, the private keys – beforehand.
We present the main characteristics of encryption
blocks that are used to protect the system messages.
Then we present the key concepts that underlie the
security of the encryption blocks in the context of
predictability of temporal signals. We also introduce
an update mechanism for the encryption blocks so
that attackers have only finite time to decipher their
parameters, despite the long lifespan of CAVs.
4.1. Masking Signals with Encryption Blocks
In general, an encryption block can be described as a
dynamical system
x(t+ 1) = G(x(t), z) (2)
where x(t) is the cryptogram at time-step t, x(0) is the
plaintext, G(.) serves as the hash function, and z is the
private key that allows for x(0) = G−t(x(t), z) to be
recovered. Here, G−t = G−1 . . . G−1(.) is the repeated
application of the inverse of G, t-times. The key idea
is that without z, the inverse hash G−1 is difficult
to be approximated by a polynomial-time algorithm
[17]. Previously, Kocarev et al. [17, 18] investigated
the characteristics of classical hash functions (i.e., based
on modular arithmetic) and chaotic systems (i.e., chaos
dynamics in continuous space) to be used as G(.).
Using chaos dynamics in encryption blocks offers
several notable advantages. ECU signals that are leaked
to attackers are continuous (i.e., x(t) ∈ Rn) and
spans across multiple timesteps. Although classical
cryptographic hashing functions can be applied to scalar
inputs, such an approach has to consider the collision
rate between similar states, which is difficult to assess in
high-dimensional state space.
To apply a chaos encryption block to our problem,
we treat F as the original ECU dynamics to be
communicated to the CAN Bus. A chaos encryption
block G masks the original dynamics as follows:
x˙ = F (x(t)) +G(s(t), z) (Encrypted Driver)
where F is the original dynamics of the driver signal and
G is the encryption block dynamics that has mixing [19]
and diffusion properties [18]. The idea behind the
mixture property is thatG(.) must be volume-preserving
with respect to the search space of possible states for
synchronization, and the diffusion property allows for
neighboring states to be “spread-out” across time by the
chaos dynamics of G [17]. Pecora et al. [15] showed
a simple example using Lorenz circuits for G(.). The
CAN Bus can thus decode the true ECU message xˆ(t) =
F (xˆ(t)) upon receiving x(t):
˙ˆx = F (xˆ(t))
xˆ(t) = x(t)−G(x(t), z) (Decoding Receiver)
However, a bottleneck for chaos encryption remains:
under what conditions can the chaos dynamics
be unpredictable by probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithms [17]?
4.2. Predictability of Chaotic Signals
To evaluate the security of an encryption block, the
predictability of G(.) must be examined. Classical
encryption algorithms such as SHA-256 protect G(.)
by minimizing the collision rate of the hash function
outputs, which serves to limit the computability
of the pre-image [20]. For continuous dynamics,
however, an alternative to cryptographic security
must be taken. Chaos dynamics exhibit favorable
properties to this end: neighboring points in the
state space diverge in their trajectories (i.e., diffusion
property), and exact trajectory recovery cannot be
done with deterministic algorithms [17]. However,
it is unclear whether polynomial-time approximation
algorithms can recover chaos dynamics when given
finite horizons for evaluation. For example, Ishii et
al. demonstrated that online approximation algorithms
and recurrent neural networks can approximate Lorenz
and Kuramoto-Sivashinksy dynamics based on observed
data over finite time horizons [21]. Thus, we examine
the “predictability” of an encryption block from the
point of learnability: How easy is it to learn G(.) and
G−1(.) given full observation of past trajectories, with
continuous G(.) and x(t) ∈ Rn?
From the information theory perspective,
learnability relates to Yao’s definition of
computationally unpredictable [22], which identifies
a random process as “unlearnable” if a probabilistic
approximator cannot do better than random guess to
predict the initial sequences of inputs into the random
process. Alternatively, modern learning theory identifies
“learnability” of a random process as having bounded
generalization error that monotonically decreases with
Page 6348
increasing training samples [23]. In our evaluation,
we consider both definitions: given fully observed
historical information, a state-of-the-art approximator
should generalize poorly when predicting the future
states governed by the encryption dynamics.
4.3. Salting
Computational resources must be taken into
consideration for learnability [17]. For example, an
attacker with infinite amount of time can crack a
SHA-256 algorithm using L bits by exploring the 2L
search space using a brute force mechanism. To deal
with brute force attacks with long time horizons for
calculation, classical methods involve adding a “salt” to
the original hash to periodically update the underlying
encryption mechanism. “Salting” is a process whereby
the encryption block is turned into an iterative hashing
procedure [24]:
x(t+ 1) = G(s(t), z)
s(t) = H(x(t), ζ).
Here, H(.) serves as a second hash function that “salts”
the pre-image (according to some secret key ζ) before
input into the encryption block. We use a similar
strategy to ensure that the statistical properties of the
encryption blocks evolve over time.
5. Methodology
In this section, we present the main components of
our methodology. We start with the basic encryption
and decoding blocks. Then we formulate the update
mechanisms for salting and encryption dynamics.
Finally, we introduce a synchronization scheme that
distributes the private keys of specific encryption blocks
throughout an ECU network.
5.1. Encryption and Decoding Blocks
The encryption block for each ECU unit follows:
x˙ = F (x(t)) +G(x(t), z(t))
(Encrypted Dynamics)
m˙ = H(m(t), z(t)) (Salting Update)
z˙ = S(x(t),m(t)) (Dynamics Update)
s(t) = x(t) +m(t) (State Salting)
where G(.) is the hash function that operates on chaos
dynamics, H(.) is the salt update function, and S(.) is
the dynamics update function and s(t) represents the
state information, after salting, that is communicated to
the CAN Bus. Here, we set several constraints on G(.):
• ||G(x(t), z(t)|| >> ||F (x(t))|| is required to
successfully “mask” the original dynamics of the
system F .
• z(t) parameterizes G, and it is updated across
time.
The key observation about the encryption dynamics is
that because F is periodic, it is easily learned by an
attacker based on observation. However, when the
magnitude of the encryption dynamics greatly exceeds
those of the original periodic signals, F is effectively
“masked” as noise under G.
From the receiver point of view, the decoding block
(i.e., CAN Bus, potential attackers) can be formulated
as follows:
˙ˆx = Fˆ (xˆ(t)), xˆ(t) = s(t)− Gˆ(s(t), zˆ(t))
˙ˆm = Hˆ(mˆ(t), zˆ(t)), ˙ˆz = Sˆ(s(t), mˆ(t))
where Fˆ , Gˆ, Hˆ, Sˆ are to be estimated by the attacker,
but are fully observed by the actual CAN Bus. Since
z(0) (private key) andm(0) (salt) are fully known by the
CAN Bus, the true receiver of the ECU information can
recover the actual trajectory of the ECU dynamics using
the update equations given at manufacturer settings.
The attackers must not only recover the hash functions
G,H, S and F , they must also estimate correctly the
z(t) and m(t) keys at each time step, or they will
desynchronize from the ECU state dynamics over time.
Since z parameterizes G, updating z(t) across time
changes the dynamics of G. The learnability of G
depends on parameters in the estimation problem:
• The sample complexity of the approximation
algorithm used to learn G, which is defined as
the number of samples required to achieve a
particular generalization error [23].
• The number of observations available to learn G.
The key contribution of S is that one can control the
effective sample size of historical information available
to the attacker. For example, if S updates z(t) every
T timesteps, then the attacker only has x(1) . . . x(T )
valid historical information to learnG. Beyond timestep
T , the dynamics for G is reset, rendering the historical
information of state trajectories x(1), . . . , x(T ) invalid
to predict x(T + 1), . . . , x(2T ).
As a case in point, suppose the attacker utilizes a
highly complex approximator such as a deep long-term
short-term memory (LSTM) network [25]. Such models
require a large sample size in order to achieve reasonable
generalization error due to high model complexity [23].
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Furthermore, the latent states of LSTMs are updated
according to stationary weights with learned “forget
gates” from data. However, if S is selected in such
a way that x(1), . . . , x(T ) does not provide adequate
training samples for the attacker model, then it will lead
to overfitting [23] and poor generalization to predictions
over future time horizons. Thus, the purpose of S is to
decouple the state dynamics from historical trajectories,
thus preventing the learnability of the encryption block
over long time horizons.
5.2. Selection of Salting and Update Dynamics
The main issue concerning the selection of G,S and
H is to ensure that while G itself may be approximated
by an attacker, H and S can update G in a way that
makes it computationally unpredictable. When S is
used to update z, the dynamics of the system change
according to some time horizon related to the periodicity
of S. The attacker trying to model the time-series
data must adapt its approximations based on the change
in z(t). This setting is similar to online learning of
time-series [26], which describes the learning problem
where the training and testing trajectories come from
different (but related) distributions. A successful
online-learning algorithm must adapt the algorithm to
handle shifting distributions in the data stream.
Thus, the problem of selecting S and H becomes
one of updating the online-learning tasks in a way that
induces catastrophic forgetting, which is defined as
abrupt decrease in performance on learned tasks due
to large drifts in the data stream distributions [27–29].
Catastrophic forgetting typically results from negative
transfer between previously learned trajectories and the
new trajectory [30]. For this reason, the design of
S and H considers a set of operators (e.g., modulus)
that can induce discontinuity in the dynamics of z(t)
while maintaining the chaos dynamics (i.e., diffusion
and mixing properties) of G. Although G can be
approximated by various estimation algorithms, we
explore several candidates for the selection of S and H
to obfuscate the dynamics of G across time.
6. Experiments
We validate our proposed framework on synthetic
data as well as benchmark data obtained from University
of California Irvine Machine Learning (UCL-ML)
Dataset [6]. In synthetic experiments, we investigate
the feasibility of masking simple signal dynamics
with salted chaotic dynamics in the batch-learning and
online-learning settings. In the benchmark experiments,
we apply the full encryption blocks and investigate
the application of the Driver-Receiver system. On
these datasets, we create a Driver Circuit that sends
the encrypted data, a Receiver Circuit that decodes the
encrypted data, given the initial conditions (plaintexts),
parameterizations of the encryption blocks (private
keys), as well as the update and salting dynamics.
6.1. Signal Masking with Chaos Dynamics
We first demonstrate the encryption mechanism on
synthetic time-series data from the UCI ML dataset
[6], specifically the Pseudo Periodic Synthetic Time
Series Data Set. This dataset features 100, 000 samples
of multivariate time-series data, generated from the
stochastic periodic function:
f(x) =
7∑
i=3
1
2
sin{2pi(22+i+rand(2i))t¯}. (0 ≤ t¯ ≤ 1)
(3)
We can see an example of the time-series signal in
Figure 1. In total, there are 10 channels with fixed-time
intervals (i.e., dt = 0.1). The number of time-steps for
each sample is fixed at t = 10. Thus, we formulate
the learning problem as time-series forecast whereby the
first 9 time-steps for each sample in the training set is
used as the features (X), and the last time-step of each
sample is used as the target (y).
Figure 1: Pseudo Periodic Signals for UCI Dataset [6]
Under this setting, there are two modes of
evaluation: batch-learning and online-learning [23].
In batch-learning, we apply the classic 70 − 30
training- and testing-split over 5 randomized shuffle
splits. During testing, the models are not adjusted. In
the online-setting, we treat dataset as a data stream,
whereby the model sees one test sample at a time and
is allowed to adjust its parameters to better predict
incoming samples from the data stream.
Table 1 illustrates the performance of various
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state-of-the-art approximators for time-series
prediction, including the recurrent neural network
(RNN) [31] and the long short-term memory neural
network (LSTM) [25]. RNNs and its variants underlie
much of the state-of-the-art temporal models in the
machine learning community. When comparing the
batch-learning results, we see from Table 1 that RNN
and LSTM produced comparable performance on test
sets, with LSTM slightly overfitting the univariate data.
As expected, the online-learning setting allowed both
models to track the signal perfectly, converging to
zero-error dynamics in finite time. This result is likely
due to the fact that the dynamics of our temporal signal
is stationary throughout the data stream – i.e., there is
no distribution mis-match between training and testing
distributions across time.
Table 1: Predicting periodic signals with state-of-the-art
approximators.
Model Mode MSE RMSE
RNN Batch 4.9e− 3± 8e− 8 0.068± 3e− 4
RNN Online 6.6e− 7± 1e− 11 2.8e− 4± 5e− 7
LSTM Batch 6.8e− 4± 2e− 8 0.026± 8e− 6
LSTM Online 8.3e− 8± 1e− 13 1e− 4 ± 7e− 8
Abbreviations: LSTM = Long Short-Term Memory recurrent
neural network, RNN = Recurrent Neural Network.
Figures 2a and 2b further illustrate differences
between online LSTM and online RNN. Both converge
to the true trajectory at roughly the same rate, but RNN
acquires more chattering during trajectory recovery.
(a) Trajectory Recovery by
RNN Online-Learning
(b) Trajectory Recovery by
LSTM Online-Learning
Next, we illustrate the effect of encrypting the
original state dynamics with chaos dynamics provided
by the Lorenz96 system [4], which is defined as follows:
∂xi
∂t
= (xi+1 − xi−2)xi−1 − xi + F. (Lorenz96)
The key observation about the Lorenz96 system is
that the chaos dynamics (G) can scale to arbitrary
dimensions. Here, we applied N = 36 dimensional
state with a force factor F = 8, which has been shown
to induce chaos behavior across the various dimensions
[4]. We plot the first three dimensions of the Lorenz96
Figure 3: Illustration of the First 3 States of Lorenz96
Dynamics [4], parameterized by N = 36, F = 8.
dynamics in Figure 3. Applying the first component of
the signal, we now have a different set of dynamics,
as shown in Figures 4b-4d. In Figure 4a, we have
the original signal, following x˙ = F (x), across 1000
timesteps. The original Lorenz96 dynamics (G) is
shown in Figure 4b. When we apply the encryption
block x˙ = F (x(t)) + G(x(t), z) (See Fig. 4b), we
notice that the resulting dynamics differ from both the
Lorenz96 and original signal dynamics (Fig. 4c). In fact,
there is a phase-shift from the Lorenz96 dynamics to the
new encrypted dynamics, which alters the predictability
of the original chaos system (See Fig. 4d).
Furthermore, we note the difference in amplitude
between the original signal (blue) and the chaos
dynamics (red and yellow) in Fig. 4d. Attackers
must not only infer the original signal based on the
aperiodic phase-shift of the modified chaos dynamics,
but they must also recover a signal that is much lower in
amplitude compared to the dominating dynamics. The
attacker, for example, sees only the encrypted signal
(Figure 4c) and tries to recover the original signal F .
However, the composition of the F+G embedded signal
results in a different set of dynamics that follows its own
aperiodic update rules rather than a simple addition of
the original signals at each time-step. By maintaining
the large magnitude of chaotic signals, the new F + G
dynamics make recovering F difficult for the attacker.
6.2. Predictability of Salted Chaos Dynamics
We further investigate this decoupling effect by
investigating the predictability of chaos dynamics under
composition with other salting functions. First, we
examine the case where the chaos function G is
assumed to be a simple 3-body chaos system following
the Lorenz equations, described in Pecora et al. [15]
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(a) Original Signal (b) Chaos Dynamics
(c) Encrypted Signal (d) Comparison of Dynamics
(named Lorenz3). Previous studies have illustrated its
predictability using methods such as the recurrent neural
network [32]. We verify that this the case for both the
Lorenz3 and the Lorenz96 dynamics.
Table 2: Synthetic experiments involving the prediction
of Lorenz dynamics using various state-of-the-art
temporal approximators.
Model Dynamics Time MSE RMSE
RNN Lorenz3 5 0.017± 4e− 4 0.130± 6e− 4
RNN Lorenz3 10 0.013± 2e− 5 0.114± 3e− 4
RNN Lorenz96 5 0.001± 1e− 7 0.035± 2e− 5
RNN Lorenz96 10 7e− 3± 2e− 8 0.026± 9e− 6
LSTM Lorenz3 5 0.014± 3e− 5 0.112± 4e− 4
LSTM Lorenz3 10 0.0087± 3e− 5 0.106± 8e− 5
LSTM Lorenz96 5 0.001± 2e− 8 0.033± 4e− 6
LSTM Lorenz96 10 5e− 3± 2e− 9 0.023 ± 1e− 6
Abbreviations: LSTM = Long Short-Term Memory recurrent
neural network, Lorenz3 = classical 3-state Lorenz circuit,
Lorenz96 = 96-dim. chaos system based on Lorenz 1996
update equations.
To investigate the effectiveness of salting, we include
static salting function to produce m(t) and evaluate the
system in both the batch learning and online learning
settings. Specifically, we alter the dynamics of the
Lorenz96 system as follows:
∂xi
∂t
= (xi+1 − xi−2)xi−1 − xi + z(t)
∂z
∂t
= (zi + bx(t)c)%p+ 8. (Salted Lorenz)
Here, we denote bx(t)c as the floor of the Euclidean
norm of x(t) at timestep t. The key here is that
we treat the original force constant of the Lorezn96
as a parameterized variable z(t), and we update z(t)
according to a discontinuous, non-smooth hash function
z˙. The modulus term (by some interger p) allows for
discontinuity in the update dynamics for z(t), yet it is
maintained by a force constant factor of F = 8 to allow
chaos dynamics in G.
Since we are evaluating this method in an online
setting, there is no train-test split. Instead, we set
6500 training points and allow 3491 sample data-stream
during evaluation. The learning model sees one sample
at a time during the evaluation phase and adapts its
parameters according to the ground truth. We use
RNN and LSTM models with look-back window of
10 time-steps. As illustrated in Table 3, we see that
the salting dynamics is much harder to predict than
the original one. While G itself can be estimated
with high accuracy, G with updates on z (following
a periodic z˙ in this case) impairs the ability of online
learning to recover the dynamics. We introduced
Table 3: Prediction of adaptively salted Lorenz
dynamics in the Online Learning Setting.
Model Dynamics MSE RMSE
RNN Lorenz3 1.39± 8.67 0.851± 0.665
RNN Lorenz96 0.317± 0.391 0.411± 0.149
LSTM Lorenz3 5.03± 133 1.58± 2.52
LSTM Lorenz96 0.241± 0.277 0.345 ± 121
non-smoothness in the update dynamics for ∂z/∂t to
illustrate that gradient-based algorithms such as the
RNN can experience large gradients in these situations
and, as a result, the solution can diverge from previous
equilibrium points.
6.3. Driver-Receiver Synchronization
To evaluate the capacity for synchronization, we
apply the full encryption block on time-series data and
investigate both the performance of trajectory recovery
on the part of the Receiver, who receives a salted
version of the encrypted state. As demonstrated in
the previous sections, the salted dynamics follow a
completely different set of transition rules compared
to the original signal and the chaos signals. From the
point of view of the attacker, it is difficult to recover the
original signal. However, we also need to ensure that the
receiver is capable of recovering the original signal F by
synchronizing its updates with F +G at each timestep.
We first illustrate the schematics of our experimental
setup. Driver dynamics indicate the outbound
communication channel that sends s(t) = x(t) +
m(t) using the Encrypted Driver dynamics. The
Receiver dynamics indicate the inbound communication
that decodes s(t) into xˆ(t) according to the Decoding
Receiver dynamics. In reality, the Receiver receives
a noisy version of sˆ(t) = x(t) + m(t) + ε, which
contains a noise term ε ∼ N (µ, σ). These experiments
were conducted under Gaussian noise at the level of
N (0, 0.05). In this case, we consider the Receiver
problem as one of robust trajectory recovery, since small
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amounts of noise can de-couple synchronizing circuits.
Table 4 illustrates the performance trajectory by the
Receiver circuit. Here, we evaluate performance by the
mean squared error and variance between the original
trajectory x(0), x(1), . . . , x(t) against xˆ(0), . . . , xˆ(t)
obtained by the Receiver. We also compare the absolute
difference between the encrypted signal s(0), . . . , s(t)
(containing the composition of signals) against the
original signals to show the difference in magnitude
and periodicity under encryption. We can see that the
original signal was recovered with low mean squared
error and variance. Moreover, we see that both the
internal states (i.e., original signal of the Drive and the
decoded signal of the Receiver) differ greatly from the
encrypted signal (denoted as “Driver Output”), which is
seen by the public.
To visualize the performance of the robust trajectory
recovery, we see from Figure 5a-Figure 5e three
different cases. All trajectories were sampled randomly
from the test set. We see that the underlying pattern is
recovered in all cases. Although we note the existence
of chattering along the signal trajectories, corresponding
to the noise-levels, we see that the high noise-levels did
not de-couple the dynamics between the Driver and the
Receiver – it simply added variance at each time-step.
Table 4: Signal Recovery in Driver-Receiver System.
Source Target MSE Variance
Signal Driver Output 28.0 189
Signal Receiver Msg. 2e− 4 1.1e− 10
Driver Output Receiver Msg. 27.1 186
7. Conclusion
In this work, we introduced a novel cryptographic
framework for protecting ECU networks from an
especially insidious class of attacks: nudging attackers.
The proposed framework embeds ECU signals in a
VANET into a synchronized set of chaos dynamics. We
introduced a novel mechanism for dynamically salting
the encryption blocks, making the chaos dynamics
computationally unpredictable using state-of-the-art
approximation methods. We further leverage the
dynamical systems framework to introduce dynamic
synchronization of the ECU network connectivities
in order to maximize communication efficiency while
minimizing excess CAN Bus exposure to ECU
communication channels. Our experiments demonstrate
a proof-of-concept for the proposed encryption blocks,
illustrating their capacity to mask periodic signals.
We also show adaptability of the synchronization
mechanism on various temporal signal types.
(a) Driver Signal (b) Receiver Recovery
(c) Driver Signal (d) Receiver Recovery
(e) Driver Signal (f) Receiver Recovery
Some notable limitations exist with our current
approach. First, it is unclear how vehicle-to-vehicle
communications will work under this framework, as
the vehicles themselves have different identifying public
keys (i.e., x(0), z(0),m(0)), which are pre-determined
by a manufacturer setting. Secondly, cost-benefit
analysis for feasibility will need to be done by
manufacturers. This work, however, provides a
low-cost alternative to current encryption and IDS
schemes, which may be better suited for emerging
cybersecurity standards [33–35] and regulatory agency
guidelines [36]. Finally, future work will explore the
generalization of this technique beyond VANETs, where
protection of temporal information is necessary.
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